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Abstract
This paper presents a speci¯c-factor model showing that, under technological uncertainty and risk averse
agents, increasing trade integration is not always welfare increasing. The reason is that changes in
the country's specialization level induced by trade integration produce both bene¯ts and cost. Increasing
specialization increases wages (e±ciency gains), but, modifying the tax scheme of the Welfare State, it also
increases income variance. The model identi¯es a trade-o®, absent in the standard deterministic model,
between gains from specialization and the higher cost of the Welfare State. It is shown that, depending
on the parameter's con¯guration, it exists a specialization level beyond which aggregate expected income
under free trade becomes lower than that achieved under autarky.
Michele Di Maio, Dipartimento di Istituzioni Economiche e Finanziarie,
Universitµ a degli Studi di Macerata, Via Crescimbeni 20, 62100, Mace-
rata, Italy, m.dimaio@unimc.it1 Introduction
The ¯rst mantra of trade theory is that free trade is always superior to autarky. This
result immediately follows from the application of the cornerstone of classical trade the-
ory: the principle of comparative advantage. The story is well known: opening up to
free trade induces a e±ciency-enhancing reallocation of production factors that, increas-
ing productivity and reducing prices, increases aggregate real income. The trade-induced
specialization process is good because it allows the exploitation of the country's compara-
tive advantages. It can also be easily shown that the gains from trade are higher the more
di®erent is the free trade specialization equilibrium from the autarky one. Furthermore,
any type of government intervention (i.e. the existence of a Welfare State) that modi¯es
the free trade equilibrium would just reduce the countries' ability to gain from trade.
Summarizing: under standard assumptions, free trade is optimal, the more the country
specializes the better it is and government intervention is welfare reducing.
Things are very di®erent under uncertainty. As it is well known, under uncertainty
most of the standard trade theorems are not valid and, if agents are risk averse, it is also
possible that autarky becomes better than free trade (Newbery and Stiglitz, 1984). Fur-
thermore, di®erently from the deterministic case, there are numerous instances in which
government intervention is welfare increasing precisely because it forces the country out of
the free trade equilibrium (Eaton and Grossman, 1985; Brainard, 1991). Several authors
have also emphasized that, since higher trade integration may increase the level of uncer-
tainty each country faces, as globalization proceeds there is probably the need for more
and not less Welfare State (Andersen (2002), Bowles and Pagano, 2006). Furthermore,
Rodrik (1997) argues that in order to evaluate the optimality and the sustainability of
free trade when there is uncertainty it is crucial to explicitly consider its impact on the
Welfare State. His model shows that if globalization increases the cost of maintaining the
Welfare State (only) for the immobile factor (i.e. labour), it is very well possible that
workers' support to keep the domestic market open would progressively decrease to the
point that a return to protectionism becomes a real possibility.
The present paper identi¯es another channel through which a similar outcome can
be obtained. The basic intuition is that, under uncertainty, increasing trade integration
entails both bene¯ts and costs. In my model, the trade-induced increase in the specializa-
tion level is bene¯cial because it increases allocational e±ciency and thus wages. But it is
also costly because, modifying the taxation mechanism that ¯nances the Welfare State, it
increases the variability of risk averse agents' income and thus reduces their utility. This
trade-o® is formalized using a two-sector speci¯c factor model modi¯ed to consider: 1)
1uncertainty, in the form of stochastic production technologies (productivity shocks); 2)
temporary speci¯city also of the mobile factor (labour). At the beginning of each period,
a stochastic parameter determines which sector is lucky, i.e. the comparative advantaged
sector, and the unlucky, i.e. the comparatively disadvantaged one. While capital is sector
speci¯c, labour is mobile across sectors. But workers' mobility is not perfect: workers can-
not relocate immediately after uncertainty resolves. This gives room to the positive role of
insurance. Insurance is provided by (an extremely stylized) Welfare State. In particular,
the benevolent government has the objective to equalize incomes across sectors in each
period. To this end it uses a system of state-contingent transfers that redistributes from
the lucky to the unlucky. In the second period, when uncertainty has resolved, workers
in the lucky sector are taxed to ¯nance a (¯xed) transfer ¿ that goes to all the workers
in the unlucky sector. The most important feature of this insurance mechanism is that
preferences and workers' specialization decision determine the sectoral tax level necessary
to ¯nance the system. I consider two distinct ways of choosing the level of the transfer ¿.
First I consider ¿ as a parameter, i.e. as the result of a (non-modeled) bargaining process
between the workers and the government. Then I explore the e®ects of ¿ when its level
is chosen by a benevolent government that maximizes the welfare gains produced by the
insurance mechanism. The main result of the model is that, if the induced reallocation
of workers is too large, it is possible that aggregate (expected) income under free trade is
lower than the autarky one.
The model identi¯es a trade-o®, new to the literature, between gains from specializa-
tion (due to higher trade integration) and the gains from insurance (due to the presence
of the Welfare State) both depending on the level of specialization. It thus provides an ar-
gument against any naive application of the comparative advantage doctrine. To the best
of my knowledge, this is the ¯rst paper that, modeling the impact of free-trade-induced
specialization on the working of the Welfare State, shows that the gains from trade are
not necessarily increasing in the level of trade integration.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, I present a two-sector speci¯c
factor trade model with uncertainty in which the government uses a tax-based insurance
mechanism, i.e. the Welfare State, to stabilizes income of risk averse agents. In section
3, I characterize both the autarky and the free trade equilibrium, I measure the welfare
e®ects of moving from autarky to free trade and of introducing the Welfare State under
both scenarios. Finally I derive the conditions under which autarky is welfare superior
with respect to free trade. Section 4 concludes.
22 The model
In this section I present a speci¯c-factor model with technological uncertainty and I in-
troduce a very simple tax-based insurance mechanisms, i.e. the Welfare State. As it is
usually done in models of trade under uncertainty (see for instance Newbery and Stiglitz
(1984)), I make the following two assumptions. First, the market fails to provide insur-
ance of speci¯c investment. Since I will consider the case of human capital investment,
this assumption is less heroic than it may appear. In this case, the private insurer, un-
able to distinguish clearly between exogenous events and the endogenous behaviour of
the worker, would provide an incentive for the insured worker to work less hard or to
choose the riskiest job. In such a situation the well-know problems of moral hazard and
adverse selection are particularly strong and the market is unlikely to provide insurance
for wage variance1. Second, workers cannot fully diversify risk through international cap-
ital markets. In fact, while it is true that there is an increasing trend in this direction,
this possibility still pertain primarily to institutional investors, i.e. pension funds2.
2.1 Production and uncertainty
Consider a small country populated by N identical risk averse maximizing workers. There
are three goods. Goods x and y are manufactured for export, while good z is imported
for consumption. The latter is the numeraire good3. Both export sectors are subject
to uncertainty in the form of a stochastic technology parameter. The two sectors are










where i = x;y, Li is the labour input in sector i (with Lx+Ly = ¹ L = 1), µi is a stochastic
technology parameter, K and T are the speci¯c capital to sector x and y, respectively
and are assumed to be owned by foreign individuals.
1Andersen (2002) argues that international integration is not reducing capital markets problems related
to human capital insurance.
2According to van Wincoop (1991) the assumption that there is no international trade in risky assets
is a more realistic assumption than the opposite.
3This assumption limits the e®ect of uncertainty on consumption to indirect e®ect through income
(Brainard, 1991).
3To simplify the analysis, ssume that there are only two states of the world, which
appear with given, constant probabilities. The µi parameter is thus distributed according





0 if j = 1





1 if j = 1
0 if j = 2
where j is the state of the world, with
P [j = 1] = ¼1 and P [j = 2] = ¼2
Sector i = fx;yg is said to be lucky if µi = 1, i.e. if the sectoral output level is posi-
tive. This formalization could describe two situations: 1) cases of (extreme) technological
uncertainty, e.g. the case of agricultural production; 2) instances in which comparative
advantages have a stochastic component that dominates the institutional and economic
determinants of sectoral relative productivities.
2.2 Labour income and the Welfare State
Workers are assumed to be internationally immobile, i.e. because of cultural and/or
linguistic barriers. Each is endowed with one unit of labour that she inelastically supplies
in a competitive labor market. Aggregate labour supply (and total number of workers)




sih i = x;y h = 1;2;::n
where sh is the individual labour supply.
The good markets are perfectly competitive. The pre-tax wage is the value of the
marginal product of labour in the two sectors and it is given by











where pi, is the market price of good i = x;y.
At the beginning of the period, before the state of the world is known, each worke
decides in which domestic sector to invest her unit of human capital, i.e. where to be
employed. The equilibrium is reached when expected utility is equalized across sectors.
Once the investment decision has been made, workers are assumed to become speci¯c to
4the sector. Then uncertainty resolves and the lucky (and the unlucky) sector is deter-
mined. The speci¯city assumption implies that, after uncertainty resolves, workers cannot
immediately move from one sector to the other. As I will show below, it is the existence
of this 'friction' that makes the provision of an insurance scheme welfare increasing.
The Welfare State: taxation as an insurance device The objective of the benev-
olent government is to equalize incomes across sectors in each period. To this end it uses
sectoral taxes to provide an insurance scheme, i.e. the Welfare State. The working of
the Welfare State is extremely simple: in the second period, when uncertainty resolves,
workers in the lucky sector are taxed and workers in the unlucky sector receive a transfer
¿ (i.e. a temporary unemployment bene¯t)4.
In the following, without any loss of generality, I describe the working of the model in
the case in which y is 'unlucky'. In this case, the government budget constraint reads:
¿Ly = txLxwx
where ¿ is the individual transfer to workers in sector y (i.e. the 'unlucky' sector), tx is
the wage tax imposed on workers in sector x (i.e. the 'lucky' sector), Ly and Lx are the






The important thing to note is that the sectoral tax rate necessary to ¯nance the Wel-
fare State, i.e. the insurance system, depends on workers' preferences and specialization
decisions.
I will consider two distinct ways of choosing the level of ¿. First, ¿ is a parameter:
in this case the level of the transfer can be thought as the result of a (non-modeled)
bargaining process between the workers and the government. Second, the level of ¿ is
chosen by a benevolent government that maximizes the welfare increasing e®ect of the
Welfare State for each level of specialization. I begin the analysis of the model considering
¿ as a parameter, postponing the case of the 'optimal' ¿ to section 3.4.
4In principle this insurance could be possible privately provided. However:
"It is di±cult to imagine endowing private agencies with the extensive monitoring and
enforcement rights enjoyed by tax authorities. In the absence of such rights, moral hazard
and adverse selection problems renders a broad based private solution impossible." [Sinn
(1995), p.495]
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Expected utility of workers in sector i is given by
E(U
z





where E(¢) is the expectation operator and
U
z
ij = 1 ¡ e
¡rIz
ij (4)
is workers' utility in sector i when the state of the world is j and z = fa;ftg is the
superscript to indicate that the variable refers to the autarky or the free trade situation,
respectively. The parameter r ¸ 0 measures the degree of risk aversion. Equation (4) is
a standard risk averse utility function featuring constant absolute risk aversion (r) and
increasing relative risk aversion (rI).
Finally, note that the tax-based insurance mechanism, i.e. the Welfare State, has two
e®ects:
² it reduces expected income (income e®ect)5
² it reduces income variability (government risk sharing e®ect)
3 Results
In this section I characterize and compare the autarky and the free trade equilibrium.
Then I discuss how the presence of the Welfare State a®ects the optimality of free trade.
5In this model I do not explicitly consider any distortionary e®ect of taxation, i.e. the reduction of
labour supply. These features can be easily added to the basic model without a®ecting its qualitative
results.
6Since the focus of the model is not on consumption decision, workers are assumed to
spend an equal share of income for each good. For the sake of simplicity, I assume that
K = T and that ¼1 = ¼2, i.e. the two states of the world are equi-probable and thus
sectoral outputs are perfectly negatively correlated.
3.1 Autarky
In the following, the superscript a identi¯es the variables in the autarky situation. As a
consequence of the symmetry assumptions made, the labour-output ratio in both sectors
is equal and the domestic relative price is p = py=px = 1. It also follows that at the
autarky equilibrium workers are equally distributed among the two sectors. Formally:
E(Ux) = E(Uy)
when Lx = Ly = 0:5¹ L = 0:5.
The e®ect of taxation under autarky As a ¯rst step, I consider the e®ect produced
by the introduction of the Welfare State in the economy under autarky. In order to
evaluate the bene¯ts of the tax-based insurance mechanism, I compare the aggregate
welfare (computed as the sum of individual expected utilities) in the two situations.





























is the aggregate expected welfare under autarky when there is no Welfare State.
Proposition 1 Under autarky, the Welfare State is welfare improving and its positive
e®ect increases with the degree of workers' risk aversion.
Proof. See Appendix
Proposition 1 states that when there is uncertainty the tax-based insurance mechanism
is worth pursuing. In addition, it demonstrates that the higher the risk aversion the
























Figure 1: Welfare gain of insurance under autarky
improving when the environment is uncertain is clearly shown by Figure 1 which plots6
the di®erence (for any given level of risk aversion) between the autarky welfare level with
Welfare State and without it.
3.2 Free Trade
Under the small country assumption, when the country enters free trade its domestic
relative price converges to the world one. Assume, for instance, that p = py=px = 1 (the
domestic relative price under autarky) is lower than under free trade, i.e. pft > p = 1.
This implies that, given the autarky allocation of workers, at the free trade price we have
that:
E(Uy) > E(Ux)
Free trade modi¯es the relative pro¯tability of the two sectors and the expected utility in
sector y becomes higher than the one in sector x. As a consequence, workers reallocate
toward sector y, i.e. the sector in which the country has the comparative advantage,
and the free trade equilibrium is reached when expected utilities are equalized for the
new value of py. Noting that in a two-sector model the level of specialization is given
by the ratio of the number of workers employed in each sector and that our benchmark
situation is the perfectly symmetrical autarky equilibrium, it follows that the country
level of specialization increases with the free trade price.
6All the following Figures are drawn using the following parameters' values: T = K = 1, ¼1 = ¼2 = 0:5,
® = 0:5. The transfer is ¯xed at ¿ = 0:35, a value that is half the wage rate under autarky. As it will
shown in section 3.4, this is also the value of the transfer that, for this con¯guration of parameters,






























Figure 2: Free trade vs autarky
In the following, I will compare the free trade equilibrium (with and without Welfare
State) with the autarky one.
Free trade vs autarky Is the free trade equilibrium welfare superior to autarky7?
As in the standard speci¯c-factor model the answer is always yes. This is stated in the
following:
Proposition 2 Free trade is always superior to autarky. Trade gains are larger the higher
the specialization level induced by free trade, and smaller the higher the risk aversion.
Proof. See Appendix
While the fact that the welfare gains of opening to trade are increasing in the free
trade-induced specialization level is not surprising, the presence of uncertainty has an
interesting and unexpected additional e®ect. Under uncertainty, the bene¯ts of free trade
decrease with the degree of risk aversion. This implies that for high level of r, the welfare
gain of opening-up the economy becomes negligible. This is shown in Figure 2 which
plots, for any given level of risk aversion, the welfare di®erence between free trade and
autarky for each free trade-induced specialization level (i.e. Ly)8.
7Note that here I consider a comparison between the simple sum of workers' expected utilities under
free trade and under autarky. No discussion will be made concerning Pareto superiority of free trade over
autarky.
8Recalling that at the symmetric autarky equilibrium La = 0:5, it follows that the higher Ly the
higher the free-trade induced country specialization level.
9The e®ect of taxation under free trade I now compare the free trade equilibrium
with and without the Welfare State. While the taxation mechanism is the same as before,
the values that the transfer ¿ can assume must be restricted according to:
Condition 1 An increase of the free trade price induces an increase in the specialization
level under the condition that ¿ < ^ ¿
Condition 1 implies that if ¿ > ^ ¿, i.e. if the transfer is too high, an increase of py would
induce a reduction of Ly, i.e. opening to free trade would induce the country to specialize
against its comparative advantages. On the contrary, if 0 < ¿ < ^ ¿, the higher the free
trade price the higher the trade-induced specialization level. In the following, I will focus
on this second case.
Under Condition 1, the e®ects of the presence of a Welfare State under free trade are
described in the following:
Proposition 3 Under free trade, the welfare gain produced by the existence of the Welfare
State increases with the degree of risk aversion and decreases with the free trade price.
Proof. See Appendix





i.e. the di®erence, for each combination of free trade price and level of risk aversion,
between aggregate welfare with and without the Welfare State. For a given free trade
price, as risk aversion increases, the welfare gain of the Welfare State increases because
insurance is more valuable to the workers. Conversely, for a given degree of risk aversion,
the higher the free trade price (i.e. the higher the specialization gains), the lower the
value of insurance. In fact, the higher the world price the higher wages and aggregate
welfare: under this circumstance the relative e®ect of the Welfare State becomes smaller.
These results suggests that, when workers are risk averse, specialization and insurance
are substitutes.
Gains from specialization and insurance gains Given an equilibrium situation, it is
possible to measure the relative e®ects on aggregate welfare of the gains from specialization
and the insurance gains. The gains from specialization originates from the structural
change induced by the opening up to free trade and are proportional to the di®erence





















Figure 3: Welfare gain of insurance under free trade






To understand why £ measures the di®erence between specialization gains and insurance
gains, note that W ft increase in the free trade porice, i.e. in the free trade-induced
specialization level and W a
tax is equivalent to the welfare level under free trade with Welfare
State when pft = 1 (i.e. when there are no specialization gains). Thus the ¯rst term
captures only the specialization gains while the second only the e®ect of insurance. Their
relationship is summarized by the following:
Proposition 4 The welfare gain of free trade is increasing in the free trade price (i.e. in
the induced specialization level) but decreasing in the degree of risk aversion.
Proof. See Appendix
Proposition 4 has two interesting implications. First, it (always) exists a combination
of free trade price and degree of risk aversion [^ pft; ^ r] for which if p > ^ pft or r < ^ r gains
from specialization are higher than the insurance gains. Second, as shown in Figure 4,






























Figure 4: Gains from specialization vs. insurance gains
3.3 The main result: gains from specialization and the Welfare
State
I am now ready to describe the main result of the paper. As shown in Proposition 1 and
Proposition 3, the Welfare State is welfare improving under both autarky and free trade.
But the taxation scheme needed to ¯nance the Welfare State depends on the specialization
level (recall eq.(3)). Thus the free trade-induced specialization level determines not only
the gains from trade but also the cost of supplying internal insurance. The trade-o®
between specialization gains and insurance gains implies that, if the economy specializes
too much, the rise in the cost of maintaining the Welfare State may outweighs the gains
from trade bene¯ts, making free trade welfare inferior with respect to autarky.
















































































Figure 5: Welfare di®erence between free trade and autarky when in both there is the Welfare State
and the transfer is set to ¿ = 0:1.
The sign of inequality (8) does crucially depends upon the ¿ parameter and on the
induced level of specialization Lft
y . While if ¿ = 0 free trade is always superior to autarky,
this is not true when the transfer is positive. As shown by Figure 5, opening to trade is
welfare improving for a large interval of free trade-induced specialization levels and the
gains increase with the degree of specialization (Ly) though decreasing with the degree of
risk aversion. But there exists a level of specialization L¤
y beyond which the welfare level
of free trade with Welfare State becomes lower than the corresponding autarky one10.
This is the main result of the paper and it is stated in the following:
Proposition 5 Opening to free trade does not necessarily increase welfare. If the free
trade-induced specialization level is too high, free trade becomes welfare inferior with re-
spect to autarky.
Proof. See Appendix
Why does free trade becomes sub-optimal if the induced specialization level is too high?
The increase in the country level of specialization implies higher wages for all workers but
also, through its e®ect on the tax rate (see eq.(3)), higher income variability. Since agents
are risk averse, this makes the Welfare State (which is in any case welfare increasing)
more costly to the workers. When the increase in the cost of insurance becomes larger
than the specialization gains, free trade becomes welfare inferior with respect to autarky.












Figure 6: Plot of equation (8). For each level of the transfer ¿, the graph plots the level of specialization
L¤ above which free trade becomes welfare inferior with respect to autarky. The graph shows that the
smaller the transfer, the larger the interval of free trade-induced specialization levels for which free trade
is welfare superior with respect to autarky.
Sensitivity of the result to the parameters' values Our main result crucially
depends upon two parameters: 1) the probability of good and bad state (¼); 2) the level
of the transfer (¿).
Concerning the ¯rst, it is clear that an increase in the probability that the comparative
advantaged sector is 'lucky' (i.e. higher values of ¼1) makes free trade more attractive11.
For each level of risk aversion, there is a level of ¼1 for which free trade is always superior
to autarky with Welfare State, even if this level increases with r.
The analysis of the second is more articulated. When the level of the transfer is
exogenously given, ceteris paribus, a smaller ¿ has four e®ects. First, the welfare gain from
insurance is smaller. Second, the smaller ¿, the larger the range of free trade prices for
which specialization gains are higher than insurance gains (see eq.(7)). Indeed, the smaller
the transfer, the smaller the individual tax burden for any trade-induced specialization
level and the smaller its welfare e®ect. Third, a smaller ¿ makes larger the range of
specialization levels for which the welfare system is sustainable, i.e. ti < 1 with i = x;y
(recall eq.(3)). Four, the smaller the transfer, the larger the interval of free trade-induced
specialization levels for which free trade is welfare superior with respect to autarky. These
values are reported in Figure 6
Since the level of the transfer plays a crucial role in determining the main result of the
model, in order to check its robustness, in the following paragraph I consider a di®erent
way of choosing ¿.
11Conversely, this implies that if the comparative advantaged sector is subject to high sectoral risk the
expected welfare gain of free trade is lower.
143.4 Optimal transfer
While until now ¿ entered the model as a ¯xed parameter, in the following I will compare
the autarky and the free trade equilibrium when the level of ¿ is optimally chosen by a
benevolent welfare maximizer government for each level of specialization.
De¯nition 1 The optimal transfer ¿¤ is the value of ¿ that, for given level of risk aversion
and level of specialization, maximizes the welfare gains of due to the Welfare State.
I begin reporting some results concerning the value of the optimal transfer under
autarky and free trade. The symmetry assumptions made imply that under autarky
the optimal level of the transfer is independent from the degree of risk aversion and on
the probability of good and bad state. Instead, it depends on ®: when the distributive
parameter increases (i.e. the share of aggregate income that goes to labour decreases),
the optimal level of ¿ decreases and the welfare gain of taxation decreases as well. The
optimal level of ¿ under autarky is ¿¤
a = 0:35 and it is unique. When !a > ¿, the higher
the transfer the higher the welfare e®ect of the insurance mechanism12. When !a < ¿, if
¿ increases, welfare decreases.
Under free trade, numerical results13 indicate that, for given degree of risk aversion,
the optimal level of the transfer decreases with free trade price. Thus, since the tax rate
decrease with the transfer, net wages are increasing in the free trade induced specialization
level. Finally, the optimal level of the transfer is increasing in the level of risk aversion.
Finally, the welfare gain of using the optimal ¿ increases with the degree of risk aversion
but decreases with the level of specialization.
Proposition 3 stated that, for a given level of the transfer, the welfare e®ect of the
Welfare State changes with the degree of risk aversion and with the free trade price. Since
also the optimal value of ¿ changes with pft and r, I now compare autarky and free trade
with Welfare State when the transfer is set to the optimal level ¿¤ (i.e. the level that
maximizes the welfare gain of insurance). Figure 7, 8 and 9 plot, for a given level of
risk aversion, the di®erence between autarky and free trade welfare with optimal ¿. The
results show that for low levels of risk aversion, free trade is always welfare superior to
12This result obviously depends on the assumed no-distortionary nature of taxation.
13The optimal transfer under free trade is calculated in the following way. Given the level of risk
aversion, the program calculates the welfare level in absence of Welfare State for any level of the free
trade price. Then, for each free trade price and any sustainable level of ¿ (i.e. the level of the transfer
for which tx < 1 and ty < 1), it computes the welfare level when there is the Welfare State. The optimal
¿ for a given level of free trade price (and risk aversion) is the value of ¿ that maximize the di®erence





























Figure 7: Welfare di®erence (¡ = W
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Figure 8: Welfare di®erence (¡ = W
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tax) with optimal ¿¤ - Medium risk version; r = 1:5
autarky. But as risk aversion increases, the set of specialization levels for which autarky
is welfare superior to free trade enlarges with risk aversion.
These results are important because they demonstrate that the theoretical possibility
of welfare inferiority of free trade is robust to the way ¿ is chosen. In fact, even in the
case in which the transfer is assumed to be set at the optimal level by a maximizing
benevolent central planner, the expected welfare under free trade can be lower than the
corresponding autarky one if the country specializes too much.
4 Concluding remarks
This paper presented a simple model showing that, under uncertainty, increasing trade
integration entails both bene¯ts and costs. Changes in the specialization level induced
by opening up the economy not only determines the gains from trade but also the cost of
supplying a Welfare State and how this burden is distributed across agents. As a ¯rst step,





























Figure 9: Welfare di®erence (¡ = W
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tax) with optimal ¿¤ - High risk version; r = 4
i.e. the Welfare State, is welfare increasing under autarky and free trade. Then I have
shown that the superiority of free trade vs autarky crucially depends on the e®ects that
opening up the economy has on the working of the Welfare State. The main result of the
model is that, under proper limitation of the parameters' space, if the economy specializes
too much the increase in the 'average' cost of insuring workers may become bigger than
the gains from opening up the economy. In this case, the free trade equilibrium turns out
to be welfare inferior with respect to the autarky one. Note that the argument presented
in this paper could be also reformulated considering a movement from a free trade position
toward a situation in which there is a positive level of protection. Noting that a lower
level of specialization reduces the cost of the insurance redistributive scheme, it follows
that, if agents' level of risk aversion is high, increasing protection has a ¯rst order e®ect
on aggregate welfare while the productivity loss (due to de-specialization and allocative
ine±ciency) is of second order. In this sense the optimal rule for increasing (reducing)
protection would state that e±ciency gains should never be higher (lower) than insurance
gain (loss).
One possible solution to the negative e®ect of increasing trade integration here de-
scribed would be the creation of a reliable system of international insurance (Pagano,
2003). But in the likely absence of it, free trade can, via the mechanism here described,
bring a reduction of welfare in each and all countries. Thus this model shows that a
'naive' application of the comparative advantage doctrine may be misleading and that,
since gains from specialization and the cost of insurance are the two sides of the same
coin, only a good balance between the two would insure the maximization of welfare.
A convenient feature of the present model is that its basic framework could be eas-
ily extended. Two directions seems particularly promising. The model could be easily
generalized to consider also other sources of gains from trade, i.e. technological spillovers
17or increasing returns. Since the basic idea of the model is that increasing specialization
increases the gains from trade but it also has an impact on the cost of supplying a Wel-
fare State, the argument remains valid if other sources of gains from trade are added. A
second direction of future research concerns the modelization of the Welfare State. In this
version of the model, I limited myself to consider only the insurance-provider function of
the Welfare State. Further research should be devoted to incorporate a more sophisticated
formalization of the taxation scheme and of the working of the Welfare State in order to
consider also its risk-taking inducer function.
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Given ¼1 = ¼2, it follows that La
y = La
x and sectoral utility is equalized under each system






















Since t = ¿







which is always true if wa
y > ¿. Finally, note that (10) (and thus ¢) is increasing in the
level of r. Thus, the higher the risk aversion the higher the positive e®ect of the Welfare
State.



































































because ¼1 = ¼2 and U
ft
y2 = Ua
y2 = 0. Since wft > wa, free trade is always welfare superior
with respect to autarky. In addition, note that
20² for given r, the higher wft (i.e. the higher the free trade price and the induced
specialization level), the higher the di®erence, thus the more welfare increasing is
free trade
² for given wages, the higher the risk aversion the lower the gains from specialization
Proof of Proposition 3 The welfare e®ect of introducing a Welfare State under free






































To simplify notation I suppress the index ft. Since expected utilities are equalized
across sectors in each system, the sign of ­ is given by the di®erence between:
E (Uy;tax) ¡ E (Uy) > 0
e
rwy(e
r¿ ¡ 1) ¡ e
r¿(e
rtywy ¡ 1) > 0 (12)
Since erwy > er¿, the necessary condition for ­ > 0 is that
¿ > tywy
Given equation (3), it follows that if pft = py > 1 this is always true. In addition,




Finally, the higher the specialization level the larger the positive e®ects of the Welfare
State ­. Indeed, since ¿ ¡ tywy = 1 ¡ Lx
Ly, eq.(11) is a positive function of Ly.
Proof of Proposition 4 To measure the di®erence between the gains from specializa-
tion and the gains from insurance, I consider the di®erence between aggregate welfare

















































Since ¼1 = ¼2, I obtain:
Á ¡ e
¡rwft + e
¡r(wa¡¿) ¡ 1 + e
¡r¿ (13)






thus, the bene¯t of free trade increases with specialization. Since Á increases with wft,
let assume, in the last part of the proof, that wft = wa. To evaluate the e®ect of higher




er¿ [wft ¡ wfter¿ + ¿er¿] ¡ ¿erwft
erwfter¿ (14)
Since the denominator is always positive, the sign of Á depends only on the numerator:
e




Given that erwft > er¿, the sign of (14) is negative if [wft ¡ wfter¿ + ¿er¿] < ¿. Rearrang-
ing it I obtain:
[1 ¡ e
r¿](wft ¡ ¿) < 0
which is always true. It follows that (14) is always negative.
Derivation of Condition 1 First I derive the equilibrium condition under free trade
when there is the Welfare State assuming, as before, that the two states of the world are
















+ (1 ¡ e
¡r¿)






















The net wage in sector y can thus be written as:
(1 ¡ ty)wy
pft










The derivation of the net wage in sector x is identical and yields:











22Since the transfer ¿ and the level of risk aversion are assumed identical for all workers
and the two states of the world are equi-probable, the equilibrium allocation condition
(i.e. the equality of expected utilities) reduces to:
(1 ¡ ty)w
ft


























The solution of equation (15) gives the equilibrium allocation of workers under free trade.
While equation (15) cannot be explicitly solved, it is possible to derive some of its prop-
erties. First, I describe the e®ect of an increase of the free trade price on the equilibrium
allocation of workers. De¯ne:
© = p
ft







































= (1 ¡ ®)L
¡®
y > 0 (17)














(1 ¡ Ly)2 ¡
®(1 ¡ ®)
(1 ¡ Ly)1+® (18)
Since (17) is always positive, the sigh of (16) is the same as the sign of (18) which
depends on the level of ¿. Equation (18) is positive if
¿ > ®(1 ¡ ®)
"
1








(1 ¡ Ly)2 + L2
y
= ^ ¿ > 0 (19)
Thus, if condition (19) is satis¯ed the sign of (16) is negative and thus an increase in the
free trade price induces a reduction of the specialization level. To exclude this paradoxical
case and in order to consider only the case in which opening to free trade increases the
specialization, I restrict the range of the admissible values that the transfer can assume
to 0 < ¿ < ^ ¿.
23Derivation of Equation 8 Since the equilibrium conditions is the equalization of ex-
pected utilities in the two sectors, the comparison between free trade and autarky when




































Since utility are equalized across sectors, it is indi®erent which is the sector I consider in
the comparison between the level of utility under free trade and under autarky. Choosing

































Proof of Proposition 5 I begin this Proof showing that under free trade individual
utility is a concave function of the level of specialization, and thus has a maxiumum.





¡(1 ¡ ®)2(1 ¡ Ly)¡® + (1 ¡ ®)2(1 ¡ Ly)¡®Ly ¡ ¿ + ¿Ly + (1 ¡ ®)(1 ¡ Ly)1¡® ¡ ¿Ly
(1 ¡ Ly)2
Equalizing to zero the numerator and simplifying, it yields:
(1 ¡ ®)
2(1 ¡ Ly)
1¡® ¡ ¿ = 0
and ¯nally utility in sector x is maximized when





Thus for each level of the transfer there exist a specialization level that maximizes utility.
If the trade induced specialization level is higher than this, i.e. when Ly > ^ L, increasing
specialization would decrease free trade welfare. To conclude the Proof it is su±cient
to observe that, since as stated by Proposition 2, the higher the risk aversion the lower
the welfare di®erence between free trade and autarky it follows that there exist a set of
parameter's values (i.e. risk aversion and level of the transfer) for which welfare under
free trade becomes lower than under autarky.
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